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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 15-2852 
____________ 
 
IN RE: JEROME BLYDEN, 
     Petitioner  
 
 __________________________________  
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from  
the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
(Related to D.C. Crim. No. 3-09-cr-00020-002)  
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Fed. R. App. Pro. 21 
September 11, 2015 
 
Before:   AMBRO, JORDAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: September 18, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Jerome Blyden has filed a petition for writ of mandamus.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will deny the petition. 
 Blyden was convicted following a jury trial in the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands of assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering activity, in violation of 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3).  He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 78 months, to be 
followed by three years of supervised release.  We affirmed the criminal judgment, see 
United States v. Blyden, 431 F. App’x 133 (3d Cir. 2011).  The United States Supreme 
Court denied Blyden’s petition for writ of certiorari on February 21, 2012. 
 On February 21, 2013, Blyden signed and placed into the prison mailing system a 
motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, raising these grounds for relief: (1) 
the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to convict him in the absence of an 
indictment; (2) bail was excessive; (3) counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the 
absence of an indictment, in failing to secure bail, in allowing him to be sentenced for a 
time-barred act, and in lying to the Court of Appeals; and (4) the District Court erred in 
calculating the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range.  On September 13, 2013, the United 
States Attorney answered the § 2255 motion, and the matter then was referred to the 
Magistrate Judge.  On May 13, 2015, the Magistrate Judge submitted a Report and 
Recommendation, recommending that Blyden’s § 2255 motion be denied on the merits.  
Thereafter, in July, 2015, Blyden was arrested for violating the terms of his supervised 
release, and the Magistrate Judge appointed counsel to assist him in opposing the 
Government’s petition to revoke his supervised release.  Blyden filed several motions pro 
se either in support of his § 2255 motion or in opposition to his detention. 
 In an order entered on September 3, 2015, the District Court adopted the 
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, denied Blyden’s § 2255 motion, and 
declined to issue a certificate of appealability.  On that same day, the Magistrate Judge 
issued an order denying Blyden’s motion for her recusal.  In a Judgment entered on 
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September 8, 2015, the District Court revoked Blyden’s supervised release, sentenced 
him to 37 days in prison (time served), and imposed a new term of supervised release of 
34 months. 
 Meanwhile, on August 4, 2015, Blyden filed the instant mandamus petition.  He 
submitted the required motion to proceed in forma pauperis on August 24, 2015.  Our 
Clerk granted him leave to proceed in forma pauperis.  Blyden’s numerous requests for 
mandamus relief were, with only a few exceptions, related to the adjudication of either 
his § 2255 motion or his opposition to the Government’s attempt to detain him pending 
the outcome of his supervised release revocation hearing.  Blyden urged us to grant 
mandamus relief, arguing that the delay in the resolution of his many outstanding motions 
amounted to a denial of due process.   
 We will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.  To the extent that the District 
Court has acted during the pendency of the instant petition to dispose of all matters 
related to Blyden’s § 2255 proceedings and his detention pending his revocation hearing, 
his request for rulings no longer presents a live controversy and is moot.  See, e.g., 
Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 974 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Blanciak v. Allegheny 
Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996) (“If developments occur during the 
course of adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff's personal stake in the outcome of a suit 
or prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be 
dismissed as moot.”). 
 Two of Blyden’s mandamus requests relate to a matter that is still pending before 
the District Court.  We will deny these requests because a writ of mandamus is an 
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extreme remedy that we employ only in extraordinary situations.  See Kerr v. United 
States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976).  In a motion filed on December 16, 2013, 
see Docket Entry No. 527, Blyden asked the District Court to enforce its December 10, 
2010 order directing the Government to return all seized property; he noted in this motion 
the property that had not been returned and he noted an improper encumbrance on an 
escrow account that had not been removed.  The Government filed a thorough answer to 
this motion, see Docket Entry No. 531, and (1) asserted that it was ready to return more 
property but could not because Blyden was (then) incarcerated and no longer represented 
by counsel; (2) listed property that already had been returned to Blyden’s trial counsel 
while he was still actively representing Blyden; and (3) asserted that it had no knowledge 
of any Federal encumbrance relating to an escrow account.  On August 29, 2014, Blyden 
filed a motion to compel the Government to return all seized property, see Docket Entry 
No. 537, and also filed on the docket a “Notice of  Non-Compliance,” in which he stated 
that the following items had not been returned to him: (1) cash in the amount of $1,500; 
(2) cash in the amount of $93,000 seized from an escrow account held at the Bank of 
Nova Scotia; and (3) cash in the amount of $12,500 seized from an escrow account held 
at the Bank of Nova Scotia.  
 Generally, the management of its docket is committed to the sound discretion of 
the District Court.  In re: Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982).  
Nevertheless, a writ of mandamus may be warranted where undue delay is tantamount to 
a failure to exercise jurisdiction.  Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996).  
Blyden’s most recent motion, see Docket Entry No. 537, seeking to enforce the District 
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Court’s December 10, 2010 order directing the Government to return all seized property 
has been pending now for over 12 months, and this delay has the potential to offend due 
process.  See Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1285 (10th Cir. 1990) (Court’s 
congested docket did not justify 14-month delay in adjudicating habeas corpus petition); 
Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1978) (District Court’s 14-month delay in 
adjudicating petition following remand from appeals court denied petitioner due process).  
We are confident, however, that the matter was inadvertently overlooked due to the 
pendency of more pressing matters related to Blyden’s personal liberty -- his § 2255 
motion and supervised release revocation hearing -- and thus that the delay in resolving 
the property dispute is not tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction.  Should the 
District Court decline to rule within 45 days of Blyden writing to that court and 
requesting a ruling as seems reasonable now that the § 2255 and revocation proceedings 
have been resolved, Blyden may renew his petition for a writ of mandamus before this 
Court.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for writ of mandamus without 
prejudice to renewal if the District Court does not rule within the specified time frame. 
 
